Abstract: For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference pro…les into equivalence classes with the property that all pro…les in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to give, for each substitutable preference pro…le of the manyto-one matching model, a systematic procedure to distinguish between those orderings (on pairs of subsets of workers in the preferences of …rms) that are irrelevant for the set of stable matchings from those that, if inverted, the set of stable matchings changes.
The many-to-one matching model consists of two disjoint sets: the set of institutions (like …rms, colleges, schools, and hospitals) and the set of individuals (workers, students, children, and medical interns). The assignment problem consists of matching each …rm to a subset of workers and each worker to at most one …rm in such a way that if a worker is matched to a …rm, this …rm is matched to a subset of workers that contains this worker (workers as well as …rms may remain unmatched). The assignment problem is not trivial because agents have preference relations on potential mates. Each worker has a strict preference relation on the set of …rms plus the prospect of remaining unmatched, and each …rm has a strict preference relation on the family of subsets of workers (which includes the empty set, interpreted as being unmatched). A preference pro…le is a list of preference relations, one for each agent.
Stability has consistently been used as the solution concept for matching markets. In particular, many entry-level professional labor markets use a centralized stable mechanism which collects agents'preference relations and proposes a stable matching. The National Resident Matching Program, that matches each year around 20,000 hospital positions and medical students for internship in the USA and Canada, is a well-known example of a centralized stable mechanism. 1 In many countries students are matched to positions in colleges or schools through centralized mechanisms as well. 2 But also civil servants, sportsmen, researchers, and many others are often matched using centralized mechanisms. 3 To be stable, a matching has to be individually rational: agents have to be assigned 1 See Roth (1984a) , Roth and Peranson (1999) , and Roth (2002) for a description and analysis of this to acceptable partners; otherwise, if matching is voluntary, the match will not last. In addition, to be stable, a matching has to be pairwise stable: there should not exist any pair formed by a …rm and a worker that are not matched to each other, such that the worker would prefer the …rm to the current match and the …rm would like to add the worker to the set of workers that it is matched to (perhaps after …ring some of these workers).
In the marriage model and the college admissions problem the set of stable matchings is always non-empty. 4 However, for some preference pro…les of the general many-to-one matching model the set of stable matchings is empty. All these preference pro…les share the feature that some …rm considers some workers as complements. Kelso and Crawford (1982) de…ned the notion of substitutability as the absence of complementarities. Substitutability says that the desirability of a worker in a particular set does not come from the presence of another worker in that set; i.e., the …rm still wants to hire the worker even when the other worker is not available anymore. If the preference pro…le is substitutable (i.e., each …rm has a substitutable preference relation) the set of stable matchings is non-empty. Hence, we will assume that preference pro…les are substitutable.
The aim of this paper is to understand when the set of stable matchings changes in response to changes in the preference relations of …rms. Take a preference pro…le and a …rm.
Consider two subsets of workers S and S 0 and assume that the …rm prefers S to S 0 . Replace in the preference pro…le the preference relation of the …rm with a new preference relation in which the …rm prefers S 0 to S and all other orderings remain the same. Depending on the preference pro…le and the two subsets S and S 0 the set of stable matchings may either change or remain the same. We will give a procedure to identify those orderings between pairs of subsets of workers that, if inverted, the set of stable matchings remains the same for all possible preference relations of the other agents; i.e., orderings between pairs of subsets of workers that from the point of view of stability are irrelevant. Hence, centralized stable mechanisms do not need to use as input this irrelevant information. Speci…cally, given the substitutable preference relation P f of …rm f on all subsets of workers, de…ne a partial order P f as follows: 5 given two subsets of workers S and S 0 , we declare that S is preferred 4 These two models were introduced and studied in Gale and Shapley's (1962) seminal paper. The marriage model is the one-to-one matching model and the college admissions problem is the many-to-one matching model with quotas and responsive preferences (a meaningful subclass of substitutable preferences). 5 A (strict) preference relation of a …rm is a complete, transitive, and antire ‡exive binary relation on (according to the partial order P f ) to S 0 if and only if S is the best subset (according to P f ) among all subsets of S [ S 0 ; otherwise, they are not ordered by P f . It turns out that this partial order is a semilattice on a subfamily of subsets of workers. 6 We refer to it as the semilattice of the choice of the union. We will prove that it is individually rational, ordered, and closed. A semilattice is individually rational if the partially ordered family of subsets of workers is composed of those sets that are preferred to their subsets. A semilattice is ordered if for all subsets S and S 0 in the partially ordered family of subsets of workers, the least upper bound (according to P f ) of S and S 0 coincides with the least upper bound (according to P f ) of all subsets of S [ S 0 , and in addition, this set is contained in S [ S 0 .
A semilattice is closed if all subsets of each set in the family are themselves elements of the family. Now, suppose we start with an individually rational, ordered, and closed semilattice and we (strongly) extend it to a preference relation by maintaining all orderings of the partial order and declaring a particular order on all unordered pairs. Observe that in general there will be many di¤erent strong extensions of a semilattice. However, all strong extensions will be substitutable. Yet, for each strong extension we can obtain its corresponding semilattice of the choice of the union. Then, it turns out that all these semilattices are the same and coincide with the original one from which we obtained the strong extensions.
All these properties are relevant because they will be useful to prove that we can partition the set of substitutable preference pro…les by grouping together in equivalence classes all pro…les including, for each …rm, preference relations that are strong extensions of the same semilattice. Note that, given a preference relation P w of worker w, we could similarly construct the partial order Pw on the set of acceptable …rms. However, this partial order
Pw is trivially a semilattice on the set of acceptable …rms because it coincides with the initial complete preference relation P w (on the set of acceptable …rms) since the choice of the union of two di¤erent …rms is always equal to the best of the two …rms. Thus, from the point of view of the workers'preference relations all orderings (between pairs of acceptable …rms) the family of all subsets of workers. A partial order of a …rm is a re ‡exive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation on a family of subsets of workers. Observe that, in general, a partial order is not complete;
i.e., some pair of subsets of workers may not be comparable. 6 A semilattice is a partially ordered set with the property that the least upper bound of any pair of elements in the set exists.
are relevant for the set of stable matchings. This is the reason why preference relations of workers will remain …xed while identifying equivalence classes of preferences of …rms. In particular, Theorem 1 says that the set of stable matchings is invariant across substitutable preference pro…les that belong to the same equivalence class. Hence, from the point of view of stability information contained in the complete preference relations of …rms is irrelevant since only those orderings kept by the pro…le of semilattices of the choice of the union matter. Thus, centralized stable mechanisms could disregard this irrelevant information.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the preliminary notation and de…nitions. In Section 3 we describe our results by means of an example, de…ne the notion of a semilattice, and state its main properties. In Section 4 we de…ne the notion of a strong extension of a semilattice and present some preliminary results. In Section 5 we state and prove the main result of the paper: Theorem 1, an invariance result, under substitutable preference pro…les, for the set of stable matchings. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude with a general description of the procedure that partitions the set of substitutable preference pro…les.
Preliminaries

Agents, Preference Relations, and Matchings
There are two disjoint sets of agents, a set of n …rms F = ff 1 ; :::; f n g and a set of m workers W = fw 1 ; :::; w m g. Generic elements of both sets are denoted, respectively, by f and by w. A generic agent will be denoted by v 2 V F [ W . Firms will hire sets of workers (possibly empty) and workers will work for at most one …rm. Thus, each worker w 2 W has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P w over F [ f;g, and each …rm f 2 F has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P f over 2 W .
Preference pro…les are (n + m)-tuples of preference relations and they are represented by P = (P f 1 ; :::; P fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm ). Given a preference pro…le P and f 's preference relation P 0 f , we will denote by (P 0 f ; P f ) the original preference pro…le P after replacing P f by P 0 f . Given a preference relation of a …rm P f , the subsets of workers preferred to the empty set by f are called acceptable. Similarly, given a preference relation of a worker P w , the …rms preferred by w to the empty set are called acceptable. By convention, we declare the empty set as being acceptable for all agents.
A market is a triple (F; W; P ). The assignment problem consists of matching workers with …rms, keeping the bilateral nature of their relationship and allowing for the possibility that both …rms and workers may remain unmatched. Formally, De…nition 1 A matching is a mapping from the set F [ W into the set of all subsets of F [ W such that for all w 2 W and all f 2 F :
1. Either j (w)j = 1 and (w) \ F 6 = ; or else (w) = ;:
3. (w) = ff g if and only if w 2 (f ) :
7
Let M be the set of matchings. We say that agent v 2 F [ W is unmatched at matching if (v) = ;. Otherwise, v is matched at . Given a matching and a subset of agents
Let P f be a preference relation of …rm f . Given a set of workers S W , let Ch (S; P f ) denote …rm f 's most-preferred subset of S according to its preference relation P f . Generically we refer to this set as the choice set.
Stability and Substitutable Preferences
Let (F; W; P ) be a market. A matching is blocked by worker w if ;P w (w). A matching is blocked by …rm f if (f ) 6 = Ch ( (f ) ; P f ). A matching is individually rational if it is not blocked by any individual agent. We will denote the set of individually rational matchings by IR(P ). A …rm-worker pair (f; w) is a pairwise block of matching if w = 2 (f ),
De…nition 2 A matching is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent nor any …rm-worker pair.
Given a preference pro…le P , we denote the set of stable matchings by S (P ). There are preference pro…les with the property that the set of stable matchings is empty. Following the literature we will assume that …rms have substitutable preference relations. 7 With a slight abuse of notation, we often use (w) as an element of F , and write (w) = f instead of (w) = ff g:
De…nition 3
A …rm f 's preference relation P f satis…es substitutability if for any set S containing workers w and w 0 (w 6 = w 0 ), if w 2 Ch (S; P f ) then w 2 Ch (Sn fw 0 g ; P f ).
A preference pro…le P is substitutable if for each …rm f , the preference relation P f satis…es substitutability. For any substitutable preference pro…le P , S (P ) 6 = ; and, for all
The deferred-acceptance algorithm de…ned by Gale and Shapley (1962) produces, for each substitutable preference pro…le P , either F or W depending on the side of the market that makes the o¤ers. At any step of the algorithm in which …rms make o¤ers, each …rm f proposes to the choice set of the set of workers that have not already rejected f during previous steps, while a worker w accepts the most-preferred …rm among the set of current o¤ers plus the …rm provisionally matched to w in the previous step (if any).
The algorithm stops at the step when either all o¤ers are accepted or …rms have no more acceptable subsets of workers to whom they want to make an o¤er; the provisional matching becomes then de…nite and is the stable matching F . Similarly, if workers make o¤ers, the outcome of the algorithm is the stable matching W .
3 Invariance of the Set of Stable Matchings and Semilattices
An Example
Our goal is to identify conditions on substitutable preference pro…les under which the set of stable matchings is invariant. Speci…cally, we aim to give a simple procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference pro…les into equivalence classes with the property that all pro…les in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. Before proceeding, we present an example that illustrates the main ideas of this procedure. 8 See Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Roth (1984b) . The matchings F and W are called, respectively, the …rms-optimal stable matching and the workers-optimal stable matching. We are following the convention of extending preferences from the original sets (2 W and F [ f;g) to the set of matchings. However, we now have to consider weak preference relations since matchings and 0 may associate to an agent the same partner. This weak preference relation of agent v is denoted by R v .
Example 1 Let F = ff 1 ; f 2 g be the set of …rms and W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g be the set of workers. Consider the substitutable preference pro…le P = (P f 1 ; P f 2 ; P w 1 ; P w 2 ; P w 3 ),
;;
where we only list acceptable partners in decreasing order (all missing subsets of workers in the corresponding preference relations of …rms are not acceptable and, by individual rationality of stable matchings, their relative orderings are irrelevant from the point of view of stability). It is easy to check that S(P ) = f 1 ; 2 g, where 1 (f 1 ) = fw 1 ; w 2 g, Note that P f 2 and P 0 f 2 di¤er only on the ordering of the sets fw 1 ; w 3 g and fw 2 ; w 3 g while P f 2 and P 00 f 2 di¤er only on the ordering of the sets fw 1 ; w 2 g and fw 1 ; w 3 g. However, the
does not produce any e¤ect on the set of stable matchings since S(P 0 ) = S(P ) = f 1 ; 2 g; while the replacement of P f 2 by P 00 f 2 changes the set of stable matchings since S(P 00 ) = f 1 g (observe that 2 = 2 S(P 00 ) because (f 2 ; w 3 ) is a pairwise block of 2 ).
We will have to di¤erentiate between irrelevant versus relevant orderings (i.e., comparisons between two sets of workers) in P f . The ordering SP f S 0 is irrelevant for stability if for each P 0 f that agrees with P f except on the ordering of S and S 0 , S(P 0 f ; P f ) = S(P f ; P f ) for all P f ; otherwise, the ordering SP f S 0 is relevant for stability. For this purpose, we will have to consider a partial order P f , which will leave as unordered those pairs that are irrelevantly ordered by P f ; keeping all relevant orderings in P f . 9 Second, to understand which orderings are irrelevant and which ones are relevant we will have to look at very special properties of the partial order P f . For instance, we associate with the preference relation P f 2 a partial order P f 2 on the subfamily of subsets
e., A P f 2 = 2 W nfw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g) as follows: 10 for all S; S 0 2 A P f 2 ,
and for all S; S 0 2 A P f 2 , S P f 2 S 0 if and only if
; because 9 Alkan (2001) also considers partial orders instead of complete preference relations to study the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings of a many-to-one matching model. 10 Blair (1988) uses a similar construction to establish the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings in the many-to-many model introduced and studied by Roth (1984b and 1985) . Fleiner (2003) uses a partial order to study the set of stable matchings as …xed points. Echenique and Oviedo (2006) also uses this partial order to identify a condition (strong substitutability) on preference relations that guarantee the non-emptyness of the set of set-wise stable matchings in the many-to-many matching model. ;;
, and P 00 f 2
. Since P 000 f 2
we will be able to deduce, as a consequence of Theorem 1, that S(P 000
for allP f 2 ; and that there exists P f 2 such that S(P 00
Subsection 3.2 below presents formally the notion of a semilattice which will be needed to state our results. We adapt this notion to our setting where the partially ordered set is a (…nite) subfamily of subsets of workers. The set S is called acceptable (according to ) if S ;. Given a partial order on A and a subfamily X A, de…ne the set of upper bounds of X as ub X = fS 2 A j S S 0 for all S 0 2 Xg and the least upper bound of X as lub X = T , where T 2 ub X and, for all
T: Given a partial order on A, de…ne the binary operation _ on A as follows: for S; S 0 2 A, S _ S 0 = lub fS; S 0 g. Observe that, in general, lub fS; S 0 g may not exist; for instance, consider W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g and let A = ffw 1 g; fw 2 g; fw 3 g; ;g and be such that fw 1 g fw 3 g and fw 2 g fw 3 g. Then, lub ffw 1 g; fw 2 gg does not exist because ub ffw 1 g; fw 2 gg = ;. However, by the antisymmetry of , if it exists, the lub is unique.
11 See Birkho¤ (1979) for a general de…nition.
De…nition 4
The triple L = (A; ; _) is a semilattice if, for all S; S 0 2 A, lub fS; S 0 g exists.
12
Observe that although the binary operation _ follows from the partial order , it will be useful to refer to both in the notation of the semilattice. This is because there is an (equivalent) algebraic approach where, instead of starting from the partial order , one can start from a binary operation as follows. A join _ on A is an idempotent, commutative, and associative binary relation on A; that is, for all S; S 0 ; S 00 2 A; S _S = S, S _S 0 = S 0 _S, 
Indeed, both approaches are equivalent in the sense that the partial order obtained from _ is (i.e., the partial order from which _ is de…ned).
The Semilattice of the Choice of the Union: De…nition and Properties
Let f 2 F and P f be given. Assume P f is substitutable. De…ne the family of subsets of
and the partial order P f on A P f as follows: for all S; S 0 2 A P f ;
It is easy to see that for any preference relation P f the binary relation P f is a partial order on A P f ; i.e., P f is re ‡exive, transitive, and antisymmetric. Moreover, Proposition 1 below 12 Speci…cally, we should have referred to L = (A; ; _) as a join-semilattice. Moreover, if a joinsemilattice L = (A; ; _) has the property (as it will be in the sequel) that all sets in A are acceptable, then ; 2 A is the smallest element of . Birkho¤ (page 23, 1979) shows that any join-semilattice with a smallest element is also a lattice. Hence, L = (A; ; _) is indeed a lattice (i.e., a join-semilattice with the property that every pair of sets has a geatest lower bound). Since for our pourpose the interesting binary operation is the join _, not the meet^, we will not emphasize this fact and still refer to L = (A; ; _) as a semilattice.
says that the triple (A P f ; P f ; _ P f ) is a semilattice. We call it the semilattice of the choice of the union.
Proposition 1 Let P f be a substitutable preference relation. Then, the triple (A P f ; P f ; _ P f ) is a semilattice.
Proof We will show that for all S; S 0 2 A P f , lub P f fS; S 0 g exists by showing that
Hence, by condition (2.6) in Blair (1988), 13 Ch(X; P f ) = Ch(Y; P f ): By de…nition of P f , Ch(S [
is an upper bound of fS; S 0 g: Let T be an upper bound of fS; S 0 g and assume,
Since T is an upper bound of fS; S 0 g, T P f S and T P f S 0 . By the de…nition of P f ,
Hence, from (5),
= T by (6).
Given P f , we denote by L P f the semilattice of the choice of the union (A P f ; P f ; _ P f ) obtained by conditions (2) and (3). In Example 2 below we show that the conclusion of Proposition 1 does not hold for non-substitutable preference relations. 13 Condition (2.6) in Blair (1988) says that for all P f and all X; Y 2 2 W , Ch(X; P f ) Y X implies Ch(X; P f ) = Ch(Y; P f ): 14 Proposition 2.3 in Blair (1988) says that the choice set of any substitutable preference relation P f has the property that for all X; Y 2 2 ;:
Observe that P f is not substitutable because w 1 2 Ch(fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g; P f ) and w 1 = 2
Ch(fw 1 ; w 3 ; w 4 g; P f ). Note that A P f = ffw 1 ; w 2 g; fw 3 ; w 4 g; fw 1 g; fw 2 g; fw 3 g; fw 4 g; ;g.
and since Ch(fw 3 g [ fw 4 g; P f ) = fw 3 ; w 4 g, Ch(fw 3 g [ fw 4 g; P f ) is neither fw 3 g nor fw 4 g. Thus, fw 1 g P f fw 2 g; fw 2 g P f fw 1 g; fw 3 g P f fw 4 g; and fw 4 g P f fw 3 g:
On the other hand, Ch(fw 1 g [ fw i g; P f ) = Ch(fw 2 g [ fw i g; P f ) = fw i g; for i = 3; 4;
imply fw 4 g P f fw 1 g; fw 4 g P f fw 2 g; fw 3 g P f fw 1 g; and fw 3 g P f fw 2 g: Thus, fw 3 g; fw 4 g 2 ub P f ffw 1 g; fw 2 gg. Since fw 3 g and fw 4 g are not ordered through P f and fw 1 ; w 2 g P f fw i g and fw 3 ; w 4 g P f fw i g, for i = 3; 4; lub P f ffw 1 g; fw 2 gg does not exist.
Hence, the partial order P f on A P f is not a semilattice.
Since the partial order P f inherits rationality properties of the choice sets, it may also satisfy some additional properties.
First, to de…ne the notion of stability of a matching we have assumed that a …rm f has the possibility, when confronted with the set (f ), of choosing the best subset of workers in (f ) according to P f . Hence, we would like that the semilattice L P f has the following property. De…nition 6 A semilattice L = (A; ; _) is ordered if for all S; S 0 2 A; lub fS;
In Example 3 below we illustrate the two notions. Finally, we will need the notion of a closed semilattice. 
Preliminary Results and Strong Extensions
Our next result says that the semilattice of the choice of the union
obtained from a substitutable preference relation P f by conditions (2) and (3) is individually rational, ordered, and closed.
Proposition 2 Let P f be a substitutable preference relation on 2 W : Then, L P f = (A P f ; P f ; _ P f ) is individually rational, ordered, and closed.
Proof The semilattice L P f = (A P f ; P f ; _ P f ) is individual rational trivially.
To show that it is ordered, let S; S 0 2 A P f : First, as we have already argued when showing that L P f is a semilattice, condition (4) holds; i.e.,
We claim that
To see it, note that Ch(
To show that L P f is closed suppose that S 2 A P f and S 0 S. By de…nition of A P f , S = Ch(S; P f ). Since P f is substitutable, for any w 2 S; Ch(Snfwg; P f ) = Snfwg:
Iterating this property, if necessary, we obtain that S 0 = Ch(S 0 ; P f ):
Now, we will change our point of view. Previously, starting from a substitutable preference relation P f we eliminated some orderings in P f and constructed, using conditions (2) and (3), an individually rational, ordered, and closed semilattice (A P f ; P f ; _ P f ). Consider now a semilattice L = (A; ; _). Since may leave some pairs S; S 0 2 A unordered, we may complete to make it a preference relation. A particular way (there are many) of completing will be called a strong extension of the semilattice.
of the semilattice L = (A; ; _) if the following two properties hold:
De…nition 8 can be interpreted as a set of instructions on how to extend a partial order on A to a complete preference relation on 2 W : First, it has to keep all already existing orderings (this corresponds to the standard notion of an extension of a partial order as used by Szpilrajn (1930) ). Second, if a set is not an element of A; then we have freedom but the set has to be worse than one of its subsets in A (for instance, the empty set). Finally, pairs of sets in A that are not ordered by can be freely ordered. The fact ; 2 A guarantees that, given a semilattice, we can always …nd a strong extension. Again, conditions (E.1) and (E.2) do not uniquely identify a preference relation as a strong extension of a semilattice. The preferences P f 2 and P 0 f 2 in Example 1 are strong extensions of P f 2 while
is not. Our main goal below will be to identify for each …rm equivalence classes of substitutable preference relations with the property that all members in the same class are strong extensions of the same semilattice.
The next two results are instrumental and they will be useful later on.
Lemma 1 Let P f be a strong extension of the semilattice L = (A; ; _): Then, for all
Proof Assume S 2 2 W is such that Ch(S; P f ) = 2 A. Since P f is a strong extension of L,
Ch(S; P f ) such that
But S 0 S contradicts the de…nition of choice set, because Ch(S; P f ) is the most preferred subset of S according to
Lemma 2 Assume L = (A; ; _) is an individually rational, ordered, and closed semilattice. Then, for all S; S 0 2 A and all w 2 S _ S 0 , w 2 S _ fwg.
Proof Assume otherwise; that is, there exist S; S 0 2 A and w 2 S _ S 0 such that w = 2 S _ fwg: Observe that, by closedness, fwg 2 A: We will show that
By de…nition of _ and orderedness, S_fwg = lub fS; fwgg S[fwg: Since, by hypothesis, w = 2 S _ fwg; S _ fwg S: On the other hand, by individual rationality, S S _ fwg: By the de…nition of _, S _ fwg S: Hence, (8) holds.
. Hence, and since w = 2 R and w = 2 S _ fwg,
Therefore,
Now, we claim that The two orderings imply that (10) holds. Therefore,
because _ is commutative and idempotent, which contradicts that R _ S _ fwg S _ S 0 .
In Proposition 3 we say that all strong extensions of individually rational, ordered, and closed semilattices are substitutable.
Proposition 3 Let L = (A; ; _) be an individually rational, ordered, and closed semilattice and assume P f is a strong extension of L. Then, P f is substitutable.
Proof Assume P f is not substitutable. Then, there exist S and w; w 0 2 S (w 6 = w 0 ) such that w 2 Ch(S; P f ) S and
By Lemma 1, S; S 0 2 A: We will prove that S = S _ S 0 : Assume otherwise; then, S _ S 0 S. Since P f is a strong extension of L,
but
The …rst inclusion holds because L is ordered and the second one by the de…nition of the choice set. Conditions (12) and (13) contradict that Ch(S; P f ) = S:
Because L is closed, fwg 2 A. By Lemma 2, w 2 S 0 _ fwg. Hence, and since w = 2 S 0 ,
By orderedness,
and w 2 Snfw 0 g: Then, (14) contradicts that Ch(Snfw
The non closed semilattice is not substitutable since w 1 2 Ch(fw 1 ; w 2 g; P f ) while w 1 = 2 Ch(fw 1 g; P f ) = ;.
In Proposition 4 we state that the following consistency property holds. Suppose we start with an individually rational, ordered, and closed semilattice, and strongly extend it. Then, using conditions (2) and (3), we can construct from this strong extension the semilattice of the choice of the union. Then, this semilattice coincides with the semilattice that we started with. Formally, Proposition 4 Let P f be a strong extension of an individually rational, ordered, and
Proof First, we will show that A = A P f : By Lemma 1, A P f A: Now, we show that if S 2 A then S 2 A P f : Assume S = 2 A P f ; i.e., S 6 = Ch(S; P f ): By Lemma 1, Ch(S; P f ) 2
A: Since L is individually rational and S Ch(S; P f ), S Ch(S; P f ): Since P f is a strong extension of L, SR f Ch(S; P f ). But, S 6 = Ch(S; P f ) implies SP f Ch(S; P f ), which contradicts the de…nition of the choice set. Thus, A A P f :
Second, we will show that if
Since L is ordered,
Conditions (15) and (16) imply that
By the de…nition of _ P f , S _ P f S 0 = lub P f fS; S 0 g. By condition (4),
The Invariance Result
We are now ready to state and prove our main result of the paper.
Theorem 1 Let P f and P 0 f be two substitutable preference relations of f 2 F . Then,
Proof ()) Let P f and P 0 f be two substitutable preference relations such that
Assume that P f and are such that 2 S(P f ; P f ): Then, 2 IR(P f ; P f ). Hence, for allf 2 F and all w 2 W;
(f ) = Ch( (f ); Pf ) and (w)R w ;:
Then, there existf and w such that (f ; w) blocks at P 0 = (P 0 f ; P f ); i.e., w = 2 (f );
and
Since P 0 w = P w , (19) is equivalent tof
Iff 6 = f; then (f ; w) blocks at (P f ; P f ), which contradicts that 2 S(P f ; P f ): Hence,
; and since, by Proposition 2, the semilattice
By f P w (w) and 2 S(P f ; P f ), (20) implies
(() Let P f and P 0 f be two substitutable preference relations and assume S(P f ; P f ) = S(P 0 f ; P f ) for all substitutable P f . To show that L P f = L P 0 f ; we …rst show S 2 A P f if and only if S 2 A P 0 f : Consider the following preference pro…le P f : for all w 2 S, all w 0 = 2 S;
and allf 6 = f , P w P w 0 Pf f ; ;
;:
The unique stable matching at (P f ; P f ) is ; where (f ) = S and (f ) = ; for allf 6 = f (obviously, (w 0 ) = ; for all w 0 = 2 S): By hypothesis, S(P f ; P f ) = S(P 0 f ; P f ): Hence, is individually rational at (P
To prove that P f = P 0 f ; we will …rst show that for any S 1 ; S 2 2 A P f ,
Observe that if F = ff g then the result follows trivially by the de…nitions of P f and P 0 f . Thus, assume jF j 2. Consider any preference pro…le P f where, for a …rm f 0 6 = f , for all w 2 S 1 nS 2 ; all w 0 2 S 1 \ S 2 ; all w 00 2 S 2 nS 1 ; all w 000 = 2 S 1 [ S 2 ; and allf 6 = f; f 0 ,
Finally,
Our result on the invariance of the set of stable matchings requires substitutability. In Example 4 we show that there are two non-substitutable preference relations P f and P 0 f with the property that S(P f ; P f ) = S(P
Example 4 Let W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g be the set of workers and let f 2 F . Consider the two preference relations P f P Observe that neither P f nor P . Let P f be arbitrary. Assume 2 S(P f ; P f ): We will show that 2 S(P 0 f ; P f ): First, assume = 2 S(P 0 f ; P f ) and let P 0 = (P 0 f ; P f ): Since IR(P f ; P f ) = IR(P 0 f ; P f ), there existf 2 F and w 2 W such that (f ; w) blocks at (P 0 f ; P f ); i.e.,
and w 2 Ch( (f ) [ fwg; P 0f ):
Since P w = P 0 w , (25) impliesf P w (w). Iff 6 = f; then (f ; w) blocks at (P f ; P f ) and this contradicts that 2 S(P f ; P f ): Hence,f = f . We consider the following three cases, depending on the set (f ): 2 (f ), (f; w) does not block at (P 0 f ; P f ): These three cases show that S(P f ; P f ) S(P 0 f ; P f ): Using a similar argument we can show that S(P 0 f ; P f ) S(P f ; P f ): Then, for all P f , S(P f ; P f ) = S(P 0 f ; P f ); and L P f 6 = L P 0 f :
Concluding Remark
The main implication of Theorem 1 is the following. Let P = (P f 1 ; :::; P fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm ) be a substitutable pro…le of preference relations of agents. For each f i 2 F , i = 1; ::; n, P f i is a complete order on a set of cardinality 2 jW j . Identify, using (2), the subfamily of subsets of workers A P f i that are the choice of themselves. Construct, using (3), the partial order
on A P f i . All information needed to compute the set of stable matchings at preference pro…le P is embedded in the pro…le = ( P f 1 ; :::; P fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm ). Moreover, any preference pro…le P 0 = (P 0 f 1 ; :::; P 0 fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm ) such that P 0 f i = P f i for all i = 1; :::; n has the property that S(P ) = S(P 0 ). Hence, we can partition the set of substitutable preference pro…les into equivalence classes in such a way that all preference pro…les in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. A pro…le = ( f 1 ; :::; fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm ) of partial orders may be used as the representative of each class. All substitutable preference pro…les in which preference relations of …rms are strong extensions of their corresponding partial order belong to the same equivalence class (see the …gure below). Thus, any centralized mechanism that proposes a stable matching for each preference pro…le P = (P f 1 ; :::; P fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm ) can use as input, instead, the corresponding pro…le of partial orders = ( P f 1 ; :::; P fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm ).
Set of substitutable preference pro…les Representative P = (P f 1 ; :::; P fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm )
...
; :::; P 0 fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm ) ! = ( f 1 ; :::; fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm ) S(P ) = ::: = S(P 0 )
::: ::: P = ( P f 1 ; :::; P fn ; P w 1 ; :::; P wm )
... ::: ::: P = (P f 1 ; :::;P fn ;P w 1 ; :::;P wm )
... P 0 = (P 0 f 1 ; :::;P 0 fn ;P w 1 ; :::;P wm ) !^ = (^ f 1 ; :::;^ fn ;P w 1 ; :::;P wm ) S(P ) = ::: = S(P 0 )
